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1 Introduction
The entanglements between religion and politics
have undoubtedly become an important arena
for contestations over issues of gender equality
and women’s rights.1 This article argues that
both discourses on gender equality and religious
rhetoric have become instrumentalised in the
service of a variety of political agendas. These
agendas reflect, among other things, the
complex interactions between the political
economy of neoliberalism and the new geo-
politics of the so-called ‘war on terror’. I would,
therefore, like to propose that we adopt more
rigorous forms of institutional analysis that
transcend the categories of religious versus
secular, Western vs non-Western, global vs local
and modern vs traditional (or ‘alternative’
modern) to better come to grips with fluid
networks of influence that shape struggles for
gender equality in different contexts.
2 Instrumentalisation
Let me start with a vignette from Turkey, which
clearly illustrates the theme of
‘instrumentalisation’. On 18 July 2010, the
Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdogan,
held a meeting with women’s non-government
organisations (NGOs) in the context of the
‘Democratic Initiative and National Unity and
Brotherhood Project’, also dubbed ‘the Kurdish
Initiative’ in the popular press. This project aims
to address and remedy the conflict that has
plagued the South-east of the country, pitting the
Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) against the
Turkish military. Erdogan interpellated the
women present as mothers saying that ‘their
voices would drown out the sounds of bullets’
since no pain equals that of a woman whose son
has fallen victim to war. It is important to note
that a number of the 80-odd attendees were
members of NGOs with known feminist
credentials. This explains why a participant took
issue with the Prime Minister for addressing
them only as mothers, overlooking the fact that
they were fully fledged economic, political and
juridical personae. At this point, Erdogan
apparently said: ‘I do not believe in the equality
of men and women. I believe in equal
opportunities. Men and women are different and
complementary (mutemmim)’.
The equality vs difference debate has a long
pedigree in feminist theory. It was presumably
not, however, Joan Scott’s (1990) incisive
interventions on this question that Erdogan had
in mind but rather the Islamic concept of fitrat, a
version of the ‘biology is destiny’ argument. The
reactions of the participants at the meeting were
widely reported in the press as, of ‘utter shock’,
‘having the effect of a cold shower’, ‘total
astonishment’ and ‘deep disappointment’. The
only interesting question to pose here is: Why did
this comment cause so much consternation
coming from a Prime Minister who had never
made a secret of his conservative Islamist
leanings?
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The answer goes to the very heart of the question
of instrumentalisation of gender issues – in
Turkey as elsewhere. It speaks of a history of
mutual entanglement and collaboration between
very differently positioned state and non-state
actors. To understand this particular dynamic, one
must go back to the early 2000s and to the first
period of the Justice and Development Party’s
rule, a period when European Union accession
and meeting the Copenhagen criteria were high
on the political agenda. It was also a period of the
unprecedented legal change – the most ambitious
since the Kemalist reforms of the 1920s and
1930s. The new Turkish Civil Code, passed in
November 2001, abolished the supremacy of men
in marriage and established the full equality of
men and women in the family (with respect to
rights over the family abode, marital property,
divorce, child custody, inheritance and rights to
work and travel). The changes to the Turkish
Penal Code, passed in September 2004, were also
extensive: new measures were put in place to
prevent sentence reduction for ‘killings in the
name of customary law’ (so-called honour
killings), now defined as aggravated homicide;
marital rape is criminalised, the article foreseeing
a reduction or suspension of the sentence of
rapists; abductors marrying their victims is
abolished; sexual offences such as harassment at
the workplace are criminalised; regarding the
regulation of sexual crimes, the discrimination
between virgins and non-virgins, married and
unmarried women was abolished. This is the
closest Turkey has ever come to comply, at least on
paper, with the Committee on the Elimination of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW).
Of course, the Turkish women’s movement,
women’s professional associations and women’s
NGOs had played an important role in securing
these outcomes. Turkish women’s rights activists
also sat on high profile international bodies
(participating in CEDAW and working as United
Nations special rapporteur on Violence against
Women, for example). Previous successful
collaboration with international and governmental
bodies may, therefore, go some way towards
explaining the consternation at the Prime
Minister’s comments. They undoubtedly brought
latent anxieties to the surface. How secure was
state legislation in guaranteeing women equal
inheritance, divorce and child custody rights?
Turkish women, whether secular or Muslim, would
have a great deal to lose. If we are to believe survey
results, women who identify themselves as Muslim
believers do not seem to condone polygamy any
more than their secular sisters.
In short, the Prime Minister’s comment must be
situated in the complicated political
choreography between women’s NGOs co-opted
to play the European card and active in dealings
with the international community, and the
political constituencies the Prime Minister
belongs to. The Justice and Development Party
represents the neoliberal and ‘liberal
democratic’ splinter of the former Welfare Party
that overtly promoted changing the constitution
and state laws in favour of Sharia-based
legislation. Accommodating internal pressures
and external demands, thus, resulted in
conjunctural and context-specific dispositions
and utterances on matters of gender equality.
3 The politics of gender
I would like to suggest that the habitual lenses
we have trained on issues of religion in relation
to women’s rights may have been of limited use.
The debates in Turkey, as in many parts of the
Muslim world, have become imprisoned within
the narrow paradigms of secularism vs Islamism,
post-colonialism, modernisation and modernity.
These debates have created sterile demonologies
with proponents of modernisation relegating
religion to a sphere of tradition and
obscurantism, while critics of secularism have
pointed to its Western genealogies and
authoritarian and colonial precedents.
I would also like to suggest that these parameters
no longer adequately reflect (if they ever did)
what I define as the politics of gender, namely
processes of appropriation, contestation and
reinterpretation of positions on gender relations
and women’s rights by state, non-state and global
actors. These categories are intentionally left
blank, since they involve players with very
different orientations and fluid agendas. Thus,
state actors, as in Saudi Arabia, may have a
religio–political agenda based on the export of
the Wahhabi2 doctrine and creation of well-
funded networks to that effect. Non-state actors
(such as NGOs) may, likewise, have religious
agendas and act with both state backing and
funding from international donors, while others
may stake out more secular aims. Global actors,
including the United Nations system and
transnational Islamic organisations, contribute to
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a complex ideational infrastructure that frames
debates on gender equality. I would therefore like
to propose that a focus on networks might
provide greater mileage in understanding how
the politics of gender plays out.
4 Focus on networks
I would like to develop this argument primarily
with reference to Afghanistan – a prototypical
case of the instrumentalisation of women’s rights
discourse that makes the position of women
fighting for an expansion of their rights
practically untenable. There are different layers
of influence to this instrumentalisation process
(Kandiyoti 2009). First, there is the geopolitical
context of the post-9/11, ‘Operation Enduring
Freedom’ in Afghanistan. The interventions of
Laura Bush and Cherie Blair on behalf of
oppressed Muslim women, far from inspiring an
unqualified response of international feminist
solidarity, provoked sharp critical reactions from
many feminists in the North. However, the
presentation of these interventions as ‘cultural
imperialism’ had the unfortunate side-effect of
locking the women of Afghanistan into an
essentialised concept of cultural indigeneity that
hid from view the social and political effects of
successive interventions establishing the
ascendancy of Islamist parties backed by a
variety of foreign patrons during the Cold War.
Second, the workings of global governance
institutions (United Nations agencies in
particular) in the service of a gender equality
agenda in Afghanistan instituted a form of
donor-driven gender activism that could not
reach beyond the ministries in Kabul in a
country where the writ of the government barely
extended outside the capital. This made the
technocratic formula of ‘gender mainstreaming’
politically hollow and ushered in another layer of
instrumentalism – this time in the service of
development and post-conflict reconstruction.
It is, however, in the nature of internal political
settlements between different political factions
that we see the most graphic deployment of
religion as a means of deal-making, with
significant consequences for women’s rights. For
example, the passage of the Shiite Personal Status
Law in Afghanistan (signed by President Karzai in
March 2009 and passed with revisions in July
2009) is one such instance. Ostensibly giving
recognition to the persecuted Shia minorities by
according them separate legislation, this law
introduced significant restrictions on the rights of
Shia women. It was spearheaded by a group of
Afghan Shia clerics with ties to Iran, and by the
Shia scholar Sheikh Asif Mohseni in particular,
who was making a bid for the leadership of the
Shia population (although he was not a member
of the ethnic Hazara community, who account for
most Shias in Afghanistan and many of whom
resented his initiative). However, a cross-factional
alliance of religious interests was able to assert
authority over law-making, sidelining due
legislative process and attempting to intimidate
the women’s and human rights activists who
protested (Oates 2009). Most significantly, the
acceptance of the law by a hard-line Sunni leader,
Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, who had initially opposed it,
signalled an arrangement whereby Sunni and Shia
actors would recognise each other’s exclusive
authority over their respective jurisprudence. This
move was designed to delegitimise any other
source of authority, notwithstanding the fact that
Afghanistan became a party to CEDAW in 2003
and that the 2004 constitution stipulates that the
government must abide by the international
treaties and conventions to which it is a signatory.
The passage of this law was, at least initially, met
with total passivity by members of the
international community wary of standing in the
way of expanding minority rights and making a
gesture towards pluralism, even if that implied a
raw deal for Shia women.
There is, therefore, an arena – we might loosely
label as the arena of clerical interests – which also
manifests itself globally (Kandiyoti 2010). These
interests famously came into focus during the
International Conference on Population and
Development in Cairo in 1994 when the
representatives of the Holy See entered into an
alliance with Islamic conservatives to resist
adopting the conference programme of action.
Above and beyond the details of their substantive
objections, this transnational alliance aimed to
establish the principle that matters relating to
sexuality, to the control of female bodies and to
reproductive choice do not belong to the realm of
civic deliberation, public choice or human rights,
but to the domain of morality defined by doctrinal
imperatives (and conceptions of sin and virtue).
The Pope’s recent visit to the UK highlighted,
yet again, that he had no compunction
denouncing the laws of a sovereign state – more
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specifically the Equality Bill – laws that were
duly passed through a democratically elected
parliament. However critical we might be of the
global human rights discourse and the
bureaucratisation of human rights monitoring,
we must recognise the widespread use of rights
language – for instance the Pope condemning the
Equality Bill in the name of the human rights of
believing Catholics who want to retain their
right to discriminate against gay people – and
the fact that human rights instruments are part
of a global struggle led by powerful clerical
interests, sometimes backed by states, to
eliminate secular spaces in favour of a religious
monopoly over issues concerning women’s rights.
Even more troubling than the bids by
institutionalised religions for a higher profile in
public life, is the fact that mainstream donors and
actors are themselves involved in the business of
promoting faith-based organisations as conduits
for aid and welfare services. The facile cliché that
Western donor agencies are, through their efforts
at gender mainstreaming, ‘imposing’ a Western
(and presumably secular) model of rights proves,
upon inspection, to be quite shallow. There is little
doubt that there has been widespread
dissemination and circulation of various
technocratic tools and approaches (critiqued in
Cornwall et al. 2007) and the promotion of an
NGO sector that could deliver these technologies.
However, our analyses should not stop there.
We now need to go beyond these clichés and take
stock of the effects of the post-9/11 conjuncture
and the deepening of neoliberal policies. The
retreat of the state and cuts in public sector
provision which initially led to a proliferation of
NGOs working in advocacy and service delivery is
now turning into a search for more ‘organic’
institutions with better access into society. These
are, more often than not, organised around
church and mosque. When the state wants to
shift its focus from social welfare to charity, the
comparative advantage of these institutions is
abundantly clear. In post-conflict countries like
Afghanistan, where donors often give up any
realistic prospect of delivering public goods (such
as justice) through state institutions, they also
target local, so-called traditional bodies of
governance. The fact that these ‘traditional’
bodies (like the shuras or jirgas in Afghanistan)
are often heavily engineered and sometimes re-
invented and re-fashioned by donors does not
seem to detract from the discourse of ‘bottom-
up’ participation that lends them legitimacy.
There is, therefore, a contradictory movement
within the donor community: on the one hand a
drive to expand the reach of conventions, which
are based on universal principles of human rights
and, on the other, an attempt to ‘reach’ local
communities better by utilising already existing
mechanisms of local governance and giving them
a more formal existence (and thus, presumably,
the means to avoid the most egregious breaches
of human rights of these highly patriarchal and
legally unaccountable bodies). In other words, we
now witness a form of double-speak, whereby the
international community appears to insist on
conforming with standard setting human rights
instruments and on accommodating local custom
and law in an admission that the states they
assist have little hope of making any inroads into
their societies, least of all in providing justice as a
social good. This inevitably ushers in a new area
of debate regarding what constitutes ‘custom’
and what defines ‘religion’ and whether religion
can be used as a progressive tool to bring custom
in line with universal human rights. This, in turn,
opens up a completely new field of social
engineering consisting in finding a ‘moderate’
voice for Islam (or any other religion for that
matter). The net impact of the convergence of
these diverse influences is the marginalisation –
if not total elimination – of secular spaces as
legitimate arenas for a discussion of gender
equality. I define secular spaces as spaces where
justifications for pluralism and equality can be
based on sources other than religious doctrine
(though they do not exclude religion as a possible
source). Those wishing to use religious arguments
to achieve a more progressive reading of women’s
rights are de facto members of secular spaces since
feminists – of whatever persuasion – have little to
gain from a closure of public deliberation.
5 Conclusion
To conclude, achieving a better understanding on
the politics of gender requires detailed attention
to fluid networks of influence at the global,
national and local levels and engagement with a
multiplicity of international, state and non-state
actors. The task of disentangling religion and
politics in discussions on gender equality must
therefore impose a moratorium on using terms
such as ‘religious’ and ‘secular’ and focus instead
on actors, interests and practices.
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Notes
1 A cross-national project carried out under the
auspices of the United Nations Research
Institute for Social Development on Religion,
Politics and Gender Equality deals with this
question extensively. See
www.opendemocracy.net/5050/religion-
gender-politics
2 Wahhabi Islami is a strand of Sunni Islam,
based on the teaching of the eighteenth
century scholar, Muhammad ibn And-al-
Wahhab, and is one of the most conservative
sects advocating a return to the way of life
lived by the Prophet Mohammed and his
companions.
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